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NOTES
LOOK AND CONTINUE TO LOOK
Two recent opinions, handed down by our Supreme Court on the same
day, involved the question as to whether the failure to continue to look for approaching vehicles is contributory negligence as a matter of law or a question
of fact for the jury.

In Halkias v. Lakjer, 355 Pa. 422 (1947), 50 A. 2d 286, the lower court
was reversed for entering judgment for defendant notwithstanding a jury's
verdict for the plaintiff, while in Rucheski v. Wisswesser, 355 Pa. 400 (1947),
50 A. 2d 291, the action of the court below in directing a verdict for defendant
was affirmed. In both cases the lower courts had held the plaintiffs guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.
In the former case the plaintiff looked in all directions before starting to
cross the street, Spruce Street in Philadelphia, and no traffic was in sight on this
street. He was at the corner of 59th Street and he saw three cars approaching
him on this street. Before these cars had passed through the intersection plaintiff
started across Spruce Street. After advancing only seven or eight feet from the
curb, plaintiff was struck by defendant's car travelling on Spruce Street from
behind the traffic on 59th Street.
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The Supreme Court held that the striking of the plaintiff was not so immediate upon his entering the crossing as to furnish a "legally conclusive inference" that, before he stepped down from the curb, he should have seen the car
which struck him. The defendant's car was hidden from plaintiff's view by the
line of cars on 59th Street. It was accordingly held that the question of plaintiff's
contributory negligence was "clearly for the jury," both in attempting to cross
Spruce Street at all under such circumstances and as to the care exercised while
crossing.
Conceding that a pedestrian must continue to look out for his own safety
as he proceeds across a street, it was held that "once properly committed to the
crossing, the care which the plaintiff thereafter exercised in proceeding under
necessarily varying conditions, was essentially a question of fact for a jury to
determine," citing the following cases: Atkinson v. Coskey, 354 Pa. 297, 307,
47 A. 2d 156; Pensak v. Peerless. Oil Co., 311 Pa. 207, 209, 166 A. 792;
Rosenthal v. Phila. Phonograph Co., 274 Pa. 236, 117 A. 790; Jacobson v Palma,

115 Pa. Super, 401, 404, 175 A. 731.
In the second of the cases decided the same day the plaintiff looked for
traffic on Ridge Avenue, saw none "although he looked in both directions and
twice to the north," the direction from which defendant's car came. Because

plaintiff testified he "never saw the car" that hit him, though he had advanced
exactly the same number of steps from the curb that the plaintiff had advanced
in the Halkias case before being struck, a directed verdict for defendant was
held proper.
In the first of these cases plaintiff was attempting to cross a street at an
intersection. In the second one, plaintiff attempted to cross a street sixty-two
feet from an intersection. This latter fact was held to require the exercise of a
higher degree of care than that which the law requires when one crosses at an
interesection.
In the second case the plaintiff was a "paralytic since birth, walked with a
slight limp and used a cane to assist him." In the first case the plaintiff had no
such handicap but judgment was directed to be entered on the juxy's verdict in
his favor.
In the first case plaintiff started to cross Spruce Street when he saw a line
of cars approaching on 59th Street, any one of which might have turned into
Spruce Street and, as it turned out, plaintiff's view of traffic on Spruce Street

was interrupted while these cars were passing him on 59th Street. Whether
starting to cross under these conditions was negligence was held to be a question for the jury.
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In the second case the plaintiff started to cross Ridge Avenue at a point
sixty-two feet south of the nearest intersection at a time when the traffic light was
red as to traffic on Ridge Avenue. However, he "saw no vehicles on Ridge
Avenue although he looked in both directions." He could see one hundred and
seventy-five feet beyond the red light, at which point Ridge Avenue turned,
so as to conceal any cars approaching beyond the turn. Plaintiff's admission that
he never saw the car that struck him convicted him of a failure to continue to
look and "he will not be heard to say that he looked without seeing what was
approaching and plainly visible." Gui v. Lane, 345 Pa. 40, 43, 26 A 2d 327, 328.
This rule was held to justify the directed verdict for defendant.
In the second case the Court cites Morris v. Harmony Transportation Co.,
348 Pa. 117, 34 A. 2d 534, with approval and this case follows Hamilton v.
Moore, 335 P. 433, 6 A. 2d 787 in holding that "a pedestrian traversing a highway not at an intersection or regular crossing is not negligent as a matter of
law." One has a right to cross a street at whatever point he may desire but
he must have regard for traffic "before he starts to cross." This the plaintiff
concededly did. The factual difference between the two cases appears to be
that in the one case plaintiff explained why he had not seen the car that hit him,
while in the other he failed to do so.
To show that the first case was one "clearly for the jury" the court cites
Rosenthal v. Phila. Phonograph Co., 274 Pa. 236, 239, 117 A. 790 and Jacobson
v. Palma, 115 Pa. Super. 401, 404, 175 A. 731. In the first of these cases the
plaintiff "looked on all sides and saw no car approaching." He was struck at
a crossing when he had advanced only three steps. It was held that "plaintiff
had committed himself to the crossing, and had the right to believe passing
vehicles would have due regard for the safety of those moving forward," and
that therefore the question of contributory negligence was for the jury, conceding
that, had plaintiff stepped "directly in front of a moving vehicle," a directed verdict
would have been proper. This case followed Anderson v. Wood, 264 Pa. 98,
where, as in the Rucheski case, plaintiff attempted to cross between intersections,
but it did not appear whether he looked to the right or left after he started to
cross the street.
Justice Jones, who wrote the opinion in the Halkias case, refers also to an
earlier opinion of his in Atkinson v. Coskey, supra, in which he had said:
"Once thus committed to the crossing, the care he thereafter exercised in proceeding involved a question of fact which
was for the jury to determine even if Atkinson was traversing
the street at a point other than a regular crossing: Cf. Anderson v. Wood, supra. This is not a case of a pedestrian being
struck upon stepping down from the curb."
In the Pensak case, supra, plaintiff himself testified that he was not aware
of the truck until it was upon him but since he had proceeded some ten or twelve
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feet before he was struck, the rule was applied that when one has properly committed himself to a crossing the question of his contributory negligence thereafter is one for the jury.
Guy v. Lane, supra, the case held to rule the Rucheski, case, was a four to
three decision and contains a strong dissenting opinion by Justice Stern, in which
Justices Maxey and Pattepson concurred. Though plaintiff admitted he did not
see the car "at all until I was struck," Justice Stern points out that this could
be accounted for if the accident happened in either of two ways in which it may
have happened and that "at least the question was for the jury," citing Harrington v. Pugarelli, 344 Pa. 204, 25 A. 2d 149. This case held that when a pedestrian is invited to cross a street, at a regular intersection, by a favorable traffic
signal and is struck by an automobile after he is fully committed to the crossing,
the question whether the pedestrian should have looked again or was warranted
in assuming that he could cross in safety depends upon shifting conditions, and
presents a question of fact rather than of law, on the issue of contributory
negligence.
The recent opinions by Justice Jones would seem to add him to the group
which opposes the entry of directed verdicts or judgments n.o.v. wherever the
evidence indicated a failure to "continue to look." However, only a very bold
man would predict what will be done in each case as it comes before the Court.
In Cunningham v. Spangler, 123 Pa. Super. 151, 186 A. 175, it is said:
"The rule that plaintiff must 'look and continue to look' does
not require something humanly impossible; nor is it a rule
requiring observance with universal uniformity or with mathematical precision."
The Superior Court has repeatedly quoted this statement with approval. That
the rule should not be applied, if there was something which distracted plaintiff's
attention and this explains why he did not see the car of defendant until hit,
is indicated in Ross v. Pittsburgh Motor Coach Co., 156 Pa. Super. 45, 39 A.
2d 148, 150.

One is certainly negligent if he fails to look where he is going. A lame
man, such as the plaintiff in the Rucheski case, must give some attention to where
he sets his feet, if he is to avoid falling. Holes in the street may demand his
attention and he may readily be struck by a rapidly approaching car while looking downward.
Hoffman v. George, 155 Pa. Super. 501, 38 A. 2d 504, quotes Cunningham v. Spangler with approval and notes that the rule is not to be invoked unless it is clear that the plaintiff's failure to see defendant's car was a contributing
cause of the accident.
It is submitted that the power to direct verdicts in this type of cases should
be sparingly exercised.
JOsEPH P. McKEEHAN.

